Defense) to be canceled. THAAD's enemies are quick to ensure that everyone has seen the microscopic analysis of the "latest failure", noting that THAAD is a VERY expensive program, and maybe the Department of Defense could better spend its scarce dollars elsewhere. Oh, by the way, each of the other services has at least one or two "elsewhere's" that could readily accept Theater Missile Defense funding.
This paper will examine THAAD in light of previous Air Defense acquisition failures, and in the context of today's bureaucratic politics. I will then attempt to "operationalize" the findings into practical application that could be used by todav's decisioh makers as they continue to fight for the THAAD program.
Army Air Defense Artillery has a spotted record in weapons system's acquisition over the last 20 years, The branch that brought the world Patriot and the famous SCUD battles over Riyadh and Tel Aviv unfortunately also brought us Sergeant York and ADATS (Air Defense Anti Tank System). Both York and ADATS were malor acquisition programs, costing billions of dollars, and both were canceled by Pentagon leaders. Lets look briefly at these two systems and see if there are lessons today for our treatment of THAAD.
Seraemt York
Sergeant York, also known as DIVAD, for "Division Air Defense" was originally designed to provide the maneuver commander with mobile, lethal firepower out to 
What bent Wronq
Simply put, the threat gust didn't cooperate. Sergeant York was designed for the I 24 KM helicopter threat. Early in its Research and Development phase, however, new Soviet missiles were introduced which allowed enemy helicopters to standoff 6-8 KM.
Sergeant York immediately suffered a tremendous loss of relevance -the threat was real, but a gun system, any gun system, was simply not going to have the range to deal with it. But instead of acknowledging that their $4 billion program was less than it used to be, the Army tried to compensate by hanging "Bells and Whistles" on York, to squqe every millimeter of performance out of a flawed program. The results were legendary. At one test firing in New Mexico, software problems caused the turret to swing directly at the VIPS in the bleachers. Even though everyone knew that safety ' G~IXIXII Acmmtlng Office, Sergeant York Concern about the Amy 's Accelerated Acqumtron Strategy , 3 interlocks would prevent firing at the stands, having twin 40mm barrels aimed at you tends to focus the mind -Senators and generals were diving for cover. And the famous '60 Minutes" episode, where a high pressure washing before the show shorted out numerous electronics and allowed Mike Wallace to ask whether it ever rains in Germany? Public relations debacles aside, Sergeant York was doomed. Even if it had been fielded, maneuver commanders would not have gained the protection they needed to operate freely -therefore the system was a failure.
ADATS (Air Defense Anti Tank Svsteml
In the aftermath of York, the Army licked its wounds and set out to fix the original problem -how to provide adequate air defense to the maneuver commander.
Interestingly, the replacement for a failed $4 billion program was a $11 billion Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) "family" of programs, which was approved by the Defense Acquisition Board in 1986.2 'ADATS was a $6.8 billion piece of FAADS who's mission was to provide the forward commanders a system that was tough enough (i.e., armored 8 tracked) to keep up and survive on the front lines. It also had to be lethal enough to shoot down standoff helicopters, enemy fighters, and help with the ground battle. The very impressive system the material developers came up with was armed with eight readyto-fire; anti-air and anti-tank capable missiles. Much was made of the "multi-role" capab litres of ADATS, to include its potential in the armored fight, and even as a i "supplement" (some would say 'replacement!') for the Armored Cavalry. capabilities, they were attacking a passionate and influential force within the Army.
In bureaucratic politics, failing to gain the proper organizational backers can be devastating; alienating them can be fatal. In short, due to ADATS' attempted "mission creep", large measures of the Army's critical internal support were withheld, as ADAlS was perceived to hold future threats for the Cavalry. Soviet threat, and in many cases replace "threats" with capabilities as the driver for force structure and weapons procurement. This "Capabilities Based Force" however allowed the services to compete for previously service-specific mission areas, based a Ibld 7 on the "capability" to accomplish that mission. As an example, the US Navy has never had a role in missile defense. After Desert Storm, however, the Navy noticed in a review of radar data that it had the "capability" to track ballistic missiles. The Navy now has two ballistic missile defense programs working through the acquisition process -one of which (Navy Theater Wide) is considered by many to be a competitor for THAAD. The US Air Force IS competing also, with its programs -The Airborne Laser and Space Based Laser. Needless to say, when all services want to own the same mission area, the effects on inter-service cooperation are not likely to be positive. But why are all the services working so hard at trying to create new programs that are clearly duplicative and will be run by BMDO? This leads me to the second factor of bureaucratic politics at work: follow the money! 2. BMbo Fundino IS Not Counted Aoainst the Services. BMDO has been budgeted at between $2.8 billion and $4.2 billion every year since 1986. From a set-vice perspective, this is "free" money. In 1994, Army programs received 77% of all BM,DO funding; by 1997 the Army portion was less than SO%.' The Navy and Air Force have "followed the money", and have harvested billions of dollars for their TMD programs, which, not coincidentally, also allow them to claim a role in future debates on roles and missions. For the Navy, this helps defend against additional cuts to the Aegis fleet (It becomes illogical to cut Cruisers at the same time BMDO is putting billions into cruisers.) The Army, for its part, didn't dedicate much of any effort towards guarding its investment in BMDO. Because it wasn't money the Army could "control" easily, briefings on BMDO programs rarely reached the Army accomplishment. Likewise, knowing how to get your side of the story to the media can balance, "others" who might put out disinformation for their own purposes. Finally, access allows you to control or at least get ahead of 'bad" news, such as a test failure.
Lobbyists, for their part, will seek you out, as they attempt to ensure you are on their team. Lobbyists can provide vital and timely information about congressional developments, the performance of their company, and expected barriers to success. In 1996, a Lockheed "TMD Representative" (i.e., lobbyist) discovered that OSD was about to announce a multi-billion dollar cut to THAAD. The next morning, before it could announce the cut, OSD was swamped with faxes from Congress, demanding that no cuts be made -none were. / Conclusion I have covered in this paper some examples of how acquisition programs get into trouble -some virtually unrelated to politics (Sergeant York), but others deeply enmeshed in the world of bureaucratic politics. Applying those lessons to the THAAD I program, I've offered fwe steps to improve the chances of THAAD successfully navigating the "process" piece of systems acquisition. Performance IS still the ultimate Judge -THAAD must ultimately succeed in performing as advertised. However, a skillful~application of the principles discussed in this essay could greatly facilitate a more reasoned, long-term view of THAAD, and quiet those who wish to gamble a $14 billion, lo-year program on a single missile test's success or failure.
-L TC Michael P. Locke
